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Many European countries restrict immigration from new EU member countries. The rationale 
is to avoid adverse wage and employment effects. We quantify these effects for Germany. 
Following Borjas (2003), we estimate a structural model of labor demand, based on 
elasticities of substitution between workers with different experience levels and education. 
We allow for unemployment which we model in a price-wage-setting framework. Simulating 
a counterfactual scenario without restrictions for migration from new EU members countries, 
we find moderate negative wage effects, combined with increased unemployment for some 
types of workers. Wage-setting mitigates wage cuts. 
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The treaties regulating the entry of 12 Central- and Eastern European countries (CEECs)
into the European Union enable incumbent member states to disallow free immigration
of workers from these new member countries for a maximum of 7 years. 1 The majority
of countries have opted for such transitional restrictions. In 2004, the United Kingdom,
Ireland, and Sweden were the only exceptions, and when Bulgaria and Romania became
members in 2007 the UK and Ireland also used transitional agreements. Germany, the
largest and closest country to those new members, has been particularly strict.
What is the economic rationale for transitional restrictions? Why did countries choose
di￿erent policies? One way to make sense of this is to read revealed policy preferences into
the policies chosen. According to this interpretation, the ‘liberal countries’ have expected
labor in￿ows in the immediate aftermath of enlargement to generate gains that outweigh
the pains from labor market adjustment, while the ‘restrictionist incumbents’ have feared
more painful labor market adjustment that dwarfs the expected gains. Equivalently, they
may also have attached a larger weight to alleged pains in their policy preferences. Being
transitional, however, the restrictive policy assumes that the economy would later be in a
position to better absorb immigration on the labor market, or that postponement would
lead to a more advantageous magnitude and/or pattern of the labor in￿ow.
The potential gains and pains from immigration are easily identi￿ed in principle, but
di￿cult to quantify empirically. Arguably, new immigrants carry an almost zero weight
in policy formation. Natives as a whole stand to gain from an in￿ow of foreign workers
that is complementary to factors supplied domestically by natives. This is the well known
immigration surplus; see Borjas (1994) or, for a generalization, Felbermayr and Kohler
(2007). However, in certain segments of the labor market foreign workers are likely to be
a close substitute for natives who will then experience downward wage pressure. Hence,
the immigration surplus comes with distributional e￿ects that may be unwelcome from
a political economy perspective, or may be di￿cult to deal with through compensation.
In addition, to maintain full employment, absorption of foreign workers typically requires
costly reallocation of native workers. More likely for European countries, labor market
1On May 1st of 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estland, Hungary, Latvia, Lituania, Malta, the
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia have joined the EU. Bulgaria and Romania have followed on January 1st
of 2007.
1imperfections may cause an increase in native unemployment, especially in the short-run.
And ￿nally, with complex welfare systems in place, an in￿ow of foreign workers has ￿scal
implications that may or may not be to the bene￿t of natives.
In this paper, we propose an empirical approach to identify the gains and pains that
the German economy has forgone by opting for transitional restrictions on immigration.
Our approach relies on three steps. First, we estimate structural labor demand functions
for di￿erent types of labor, de￿ned on the basis of workers’ educational attainment, their
experience, and their status as either immigrants or natives. We rely on the structural
approach recently proposed by Borjas (2003) and others in an attempt to overcome the en-
dogeneity concerns present in earlier approaches. However, in line with more recent work
by Ottaviano & Peri (2006) and Manacorda et al. (2007), we allow for imperfect substi-
tution between native and foreign labor. More importantly, we allow for non-Walrasian
labor market institutions when estimating structural labor demand parameters. 2
In a second step, we enhance the empirical strategy by an explicit treatment of wage-
setting institutions that are responsible for unemployment. More speci￿cally, we estimate
a wage-setting equation along the lines suggested by Layard, Nickell & Jackman (2005).
This allows us to place the Borjas-approach in a more general framework, taking into
account an institutional environment that generates high and persistent unemployment,
and thus to simultaneously determine wage and unemployment e￿ects of immigration. We
apply our econometric strategy to combined data from the German Socioeconomic Panel
(GSOEP) and the German micro census.
The third step combines our econometric estimates of labor demand as well as wage
setting, in order to address a counterfactual migration scenario by means of numerical
simulation. We de￿ne a counterfactual that relates to the aforementioned transitional
agreements of eastern EU-enlargement. More speci￿cally, we look at immigration that
would likely have obtained if, instead of opting for transitional import restrictions, Ger-
many had chosen a liberal policy stance, as was the case in the UK. Our results depict
the detailed wage and employment e￿ects that would have obtained from the additional
in￿ow of workers from new member countries that Germany has avoided through transi-
2Using US data Ottaviano & Peri (2007) also allow for imperfect substitutability between natives and
immigrants. The standard Borjas (2003) approach has been extended by Aydemir & Borjas (2007) to
Canada and Mexico, and by Manacorda, Manning & Wadsworth (2007) to Britain. Using German data,
Bonin (2005) estimates partial equilibrium e￿ects of immigration.
2tional restrictions. This is the pains side of the exercise. Following Felbermayr & Kohler
(2007), we then map the wage and employment e￿ects into forgone welfare gains.
Our paper is related to Br￿ ucker & Jahn (2008) and D’Amuri et al. (2008), who also
attempt to address German immigration scenarios based on a combination of structural
labor demand equations allowing for unemployment e￿ects. We shall point out the sim-
ilarities and di￿erences in more detail below. At this point, the distinctive features of
our paper may be summarized as follows. First, we use household survey data from the
German Socio-Eeconomic-Panel (SOEP) that avoids certain problems arising with social-
security-based data used by these other papers. Second, before turning to a simulation
exercise, we portray a detailed picture of education-experience-based complementarity
and substitutability, respectively between native and foreign labor. This incorporates
policy-relevant information in a general way, independently of any speci￿c immigration
scenario. Thirdly, in our simulation exercise we address a speci￿c immigration scenario
which seems particularly relevant against the backdrop of eastern enlargement of the
EU, and we do so using both wage-setting as well as labor demand parameters that are
consistently estimated on the same original German data set.
The next section introduces our conceptual framework. It describes our structural
view of labor demand which is amenable for empirical implementation, followed by a
discussion of endogeneity concerns that arise in the econometric estimation of inverse labor
demand functions, and then augments the empirical framework by incorporating a reduced
form version of the Layard-Nickell-Jackman (LNJ) model of price-wage-setting. Section 3
discusses main advantages as well as potential problems of our data. Section 4 turns to the
empirical results, and it comes in two parts. The ￿rst presents estimation results for the
structural inverse labor demand functions, including a detailed picture of complementarity
and substitutability between native and foreign labor, as well as for the reduced form of
the price-wage-setting model. The second part uses these parameter estimates to simulate
a speci￿c immigration scenario. The scenario depicts the counterfactual case of a liberal
German policy stance on immigration from new members, abstaining from the option of
transitional restrictions in the recent eastern enlargement of the EU. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
32 Conceptual Framework
Immigration must be seen as positive labor supply shock to the receiving country. The
e￿ect on natives, as a group as well as on individuals, depends on the size and composition
of the labor in￿ow. Intuition and empirical evidence (see Card & Lemieux, 2001) suggest
that education and experience are among the key characteristics that determine a worker’s
labor market performance. Accordingly, the education ￿experience pattern of foreign
workers will matter for how native workers are a￿ected by immigration. 3 Suppose, then,
that N and M; respectively, are vectors of native and immigrant labor supply with the
relevant education￿experience characteristics. With perfect domestic labor markets, the
native wage e￿ects of a given ￿ow of immigrants d M is given by dwN = YNMdM, where
wN denotes wages for native workers and YNM is the matrix of second order derivatives of
the receiving country’s GNP-function Y (N;M;p), evaluated at the initial levels of N and
M. For simplicity, we assume constant goods prices p. It can be shown that immigration
is bene￿cial to natives as a group if NTdwN = NTYNMdM > 0, where T denotes a vector
transposition (see Felbermayr & Kohler, 2007). If this condition holds, then we may say
that the immigration ￿ow dM is complementary, in the aggregate, to native labor N.
Whether or not it is satis￿ed depends on the interaction between the general equilibrium
elasticities behind YNM and the speci￿c composition of the in￿ow dM. In this paper we
pin down empirically the matrix YNM,and calculate dwN as well as NTdwN for a certain
foreign labor in￿ow dM.
However, to bring this calculus to German data requires departing from the assump-
tion of perfect labor markets which underlies the GNP-function. Our approach combines
two fundamental notions. The ￿rst, also incorporated in the GNP-function approach, is
that for any education￿experience-segment of the labor market, employment is subject
to the condition that the marginal value productivity is equal to the ongoing wage rate.
This is incorporated in our framework through education ￿experience-related inverse la-
bor demand functions, based on a macroeconomic production function as proposed by
Borjas (2003). Securing consistent estimates of such labor demand functions is an im-
portant cornerstone of our approach. The second notion, which departs from the conven-
3This is also re￿ected by the role that these characteristics play in almost all immigration countries’
restrictive quota systems (see UN-DESA, 2004, and OECD, 2007). Therefore, our approach features a
disaggregate view of the labor market along the education ￿experience dimension.
4tional GNP-approach, is that wages are set in a non-market-clearing way by labor market
institutions. Abstaining from detailed modeling of these institutions, we assume that
wage-setting takes into account the degree of unemployment within and across segments
of the labor market in a way that allows for unemployment. We implement this through
a suitable modi￿cation of the well-known \price-wage-setting" framework that has been
proposed by Layard, Nickell & Jackman (2005) { henceforth referred to as LNJ { in order
to understand European unemployment.
More speci￿cally, we interpret our inverse labor demand functions as \normal-cost-
pricing" equations within the LNJ-framework. 4 Thus, ￿rms are assumed to always be
on their labor demand functions, derived from the marginal productivity of labor. This
amounts to assuming a rights-to-manage environment. Adding LNJ-type wage-setting
equations for all our labor-market-segments generates a consistent set-up which inherits
all the advantages of the Borjas-approach (see below), while at the same time allowing
for European-type unemployment. In particular, if wage-setting does not clear the labor
market, then a foreign worker supply change through an in￿ow dM will lead to employ-
ment changes dLM(dM) ￿ dM and dLN(dM) ￿ dN = 0. We derive these employment
changes from reduced form estimates of the education ￿experience-based LNJ-framework
(see below). We then return to our inverse labor demand functions, in order to calcu-
late the associated wage e￿ects dwN = ~ LN
NdLN(dM) + ~ L
N
MdLM(dM), where ~ LN
N and
~ LN
M denote the respective gradients of the estimated inverse labor demand functions. By
complete analogy, we may derive dwM. Welfare e￿ects then follow by analogy to the
above, taking into account that native income is a￿ected not only through wage e￿ects,
but also through employment e￿ects dLN(dM). In what follows we ￿rst describe the
conceptual framework that allows us to estimate, in elasticity form, the gradients ~ LN
N and
~ LN
M . Subsequently, we show how these are combined with the reduced-form-estimation
of a disaggregate LNJ-model so that we may then calculate d LN(dM) and dLM(dM), as
well as the wage e￿ects dwN and dwM for a suitable scenario of immigration dM.
4Normal-cost-pricing simply refers to the case of perfect competition within the LNJ-framework, which
is usually presented with markup-pricing on gods markets; see Layard, Nickell & Jackman (2005, ch. 1).
The fact that the LNJ-framework is amenable to a straightforward labor demand and supply interpreta-
tion is also emphasized by Blanchard (2007, p. 411).
52.1 A structural model of labor demand
Our approach, borrowed from Borjas (2003), and based on ample empirical labor mar-
ket evidence, stresses the level of educational attainment and experience for wages of
workers.5 In what follows, we use e 2 E to denote educational attainment e, where
E = f1;:::;Eg and E denotes the number of educational classes considered. By analogy
x 2 X denotes experience level x, with X =f1;:::;Xg. In our case E = X = 4 (see be-
low). In the aggregate, complementarity in the sense described above then arises from an
education￿experience-composition of the in￿ow that di￿ers from native labor, in addition
to the complementarity between labor and other factors owned by natives, like capital; see
Berry & Soligo (1969) and Borjas (1995,1999). With a certain stock of pre-existing foreign
labor, however, altering the composition of the labor force is not su￿cient for immigration
to be gainful for natives as a whole; see Felbermayr & Kohler (2007). Moreover, with
unemployment what counts is not the change in the labor force, but a change in employed
labor. The Borjas-approach towards a structural model of labor demand allows us to
capture the mere technology-based relationships of complementarity and substitutabil-
ity, respectively, between employment of workers with di￿erent education ￿experience
characteristics.6 It is the ￿rst building block of our numerical policy simulation, to be
complemented by the reduced form version of a non-market-clearing model of wage setting
which allows us to relate employment to labor supply.
We need a framework which is amenable for empirical estimation. This requires a
suitably parsimonious parameterization of labor demand. Building on Card & Lemieux
(2001), Borjas (2003) suggests a nested CES-parameterization. Theoretical models that
look only at aggregate labor often assume foreign and domestic labor to be imperfect
substitutes, the implicit assumption being that the two types of labor di￿er in relevant
labor market characteristics; see for instance Ethier (1985). But this may still mask
5The approach goes back to Card & Lemieux (2001) and has been used in the migration context
by Borjas (2003), Ottaviano and Peri (2005, 2006), Manacorda et al. (2006), and Aydemir and Borjas
(2007).
6Complementarity here means what Hamermesh (1993) calls q-complementarity (q for quantity): A
rise in the wage for a certain type of labor upon an increase in supply of some other type of labor.
Discussing partial equilibrium relationships, he de￿nes an elasticities of q-complementarity by holding all
other factor inputs and the price of the output constant. We shall develop general equilibrium analogues
to these elasticities below.
6signi￿cant di￿erences across workers. We therefore follow Ottaviano & Peri (2006) in
allowing native and foreign workers with the same education ￿experience characteristic
to be di￿erent inputs into production, with a ￿nite elasticity of substitution. 7 Using LN
tex
and LM
tex to denote employment of natives and natives, respectively, with education level































Native and foreign workers thus combine to generate a composite ex-type labor input Lex
according to a constant elasticity of substitution ￿M
e , which is allowed to di￿er across levels
of education. The labor-composite Lex is homogeneous across all possible domestic uses.
Equating the wage rate to the marginal productivity of labor, we arrive at a conditional










e , where pex is the shadow
price of composite labor Lex which is, in turn, equal to the marginal productivity of Lex
in domestic production. An analogous expression holds for the immigrant wage rate wM
ex.
With constant LN














ex is the elasticity of Lex with respect to LM
ex, which is equal in equilibrium


















ex is the elasticity of pex with respect
to LM




e ￿ 0 the partial elasticity of complementarity between native and
foreign labor of type ex, partial meaning a constant levels of LN
ex and pex.8 While a ￿nite
value of ￿M
e does install a force of native-immigrant-complementarity, this need not show
up in general equilibrium across the board for all education and experience levels. To see
the general equilibrium repercussions, we need to model the use of composite labor Lex;
7It seems somewhat far-fetched to argue that foreign and native workers are imperfect substitutes by
sheer ethnicity or nationality, all other relevant characteristics being the same. Borjas (2003) assumes that
foreign and native workers are perfect substitutes; Aydemir and Borjas (2007) show that this assumption
is met in US data. However, even for a high degree of disaggregation we must expect a certain amount
of unobserved heterogeneity across native and foreign workers with the same observed education and
experience. We therefore follow Ottaviano & Peri (2006) in allowing imperfect substitutability and
letting the data deliver the verdict. As in their case, our data suggest imperfect substitutability; see
below. For an earlier treatment of this issue, see Grossman (1982).
8See Hamermesh (1993) who stresses that these partial elasticities hold for a constant goods price { in
our case a constant shadow value of Lex. Borjas (2003) considers elasticities similar to the ones derived
below, but ignoring this bottom-level complementarity.
7see below.
How do we estimate the parameters of (1)? Allowing for cross-time variation, and
dividing through by the conditional inverse demand for immigrant labor LM
ex, we obtain

























+ dex + det + dxt + utex; (2)
where utex is a regular error term for time t. Throughout this paper, we use a time
index t when writing estimation equations. Following Ottaviano & Peri (2005, 2006),










by education￿experience ￿xed e￿ects dex; as well as
education￿time and experience￿time ￿xed e￿ects, det and dxt; respectively. This restricts








to ensure identi￿cation of ￿M
e .9 Writing ^ Dtex = ^ dex+











. We also estimate education group speci￿c ￿M
e
using dx instead of Dtex. These estimates may be used, alongside ^ ￿
M
e , to calculate an
estimate of composite labor ^ Ltex according to (1), as well as an estimate of the minimum








Composite labor of type ex is further used in the domestic economy according to two









where ￿x denotes the elasticity of substitution across di￿erent experience levels, assumed
to be constant for all educational attainments, and ￿ex are share parameters. We normal-
ize
P
x2X ￿ex = 1. Equating the wage for composite labor Lex with the marginal produc-
tivity, we obtain a conditional inverse labor demand function wex = qe￿ex (Le /Lex)
1=￿x
,
where qe is the shadow price of composite e-type labor Le, in complete analogy to pex
above. We thus arrive at an estimation equation of the following form
lnwtex = ￿
1
￿x lnLtex + dex + det + dt + ￿tex; (4)










cannot be absorbed by period-education-experience ￿xed e￿ects
because we would have as many ￿xed e￿ects as we have observations. With the restriction, we have a
total number of observations of TEX to estimate EX + TE + TX ￿xed e￿ects and E elasticity values
￿M
e (T being the number of time periods).
8where ￿tex again is an error term for time t. This is amenable to empirical estimation
using the estimates ^ Ltex and ^ wtex obtained in the ￿rst step to replace wtex and Ltex. By
analogy to the preceding step, we have replaced ln qte + 1
￿x lnLte +ln￿tex by ￿xed e￿ects,
the identifying assumption being that ￿ex is time-invariant. The term ln qe + 1
￿x lnLe is
thus represented by ￿xed e￿ects det + dt: This picks up the e￿ect of the Le-employment
levels on the marginal productivity of Lex for a given shadow-value of Le, as well as the
change of that value which follows from further use of Le in the economy; see below.
The link to native wages wN
tex is given through the condition that pex = wex. This


























ex stands for the elasticity of qe with respect to LM
ex. A higher LM
ex a￿ects pex through a
higher composite labor Lex according to ￿sM




￿x, conditional on qe, the shadow-value of Le which is determined
below. We may now also consider cross-experience e￿ects. In particular, all workers
with education e, but experience levels x0 6= x are e￿ected through a change in ‘their’








Note that, due to the uniform elasticity of substitution ￿x, this is the same for all x0 6= x
within e, for a given ex-type of labor in￿ow. Intuitively, old native engineers bene￿t




￿x > 0, conditional on qe. If ￿x ￿
￿M




ex;meaning that native-migrant complementarity is even larger within
the same experience level than across experience level. Intuitively, this is because young
engineers are a better substitutes for more experienced engineers (native or foreign), than
they are for foreign engineers with the same low experience. Moreover, if ￿x ￿
￿M
e >
1 ￿ sex, then !N
ex > 0, conditional on qe. If ￿x ￿
￿M
e < 1 ￿ sex, despite the element of
complementarity introduced by ￿M
e < 1, native ex-type workers are q-substitutes (in the
sense of Hamermesh, 1993) for foreign workers.
Next, we endogenize qe from the marginal productivity of composite e-type labor.




the estimate ^ ￿
x we may calculate an estimate ^ Lte according to (3), as well as unit costs
^ wte according to we(we1;:::;weX), the expenditure function dual to (3). In turn, these









9which aggregates across all educational levels to arrive at a composite labor input Le,
with an elasticity of substitution ￿e and share parameters ￿e, with ￿e2E￿e = 1. By
complete analogy to the above, we have a conditional inverse labor demand function
we = z￿e (L/Le)
1=￿e




￿e lnLte + dt + ￿et + ￿te; (6)
where use the aforementioned estimates ^ wte and ^ Lte in lieu of wte and Lte. Again, we
have replaced ln zt + ln￿te + 1
￿e lnLt by ￿xed e￿ects. The term ln zt + 1
￿e lnLt is time
varying, with an interpretation which follows by analogy from the preceding steps. The
shadow-value zt has di￿erent interpretations. It may re￿ect overall output to be produced,
as in Borjas (2003), or the aggregate capital to labor ratio which is governed by capital
accumulation e￿ects, as in Ottaviano & Peri (2006). In the estimation it is picked up by
time-￿xed e￿ects dt. We further employ the identifying restriction that the parameters
￿te follow education-speci￿c time trends, i.e., ￿te = ￿0e exp(￿et).












exsex (1 ￿ se)
￿
￿e, where se is the share of wage pay-
ments to e-type labor in the wage bill for L, and ￿
z
ex is the elasticity of z with respect to LM
ex:
The term sM
exsex (1 ￿ se)
￿
￿e is interpreted by complete analogy to the above, now looking
at how an increase of LM
ex a￿ects a￿ects the marginal productivity of composite labor Le. It
is obvious that endogenizing upper-level shadow values of composite labor unambiguously
reduces the algebraic value of the direct elasticity of complementarity, with the wage shares
determining the exact point where it turns negative. There are now also cross-educational
complementarity e￿ects, whereby such an increase a￿ects wages of native workers in edu-
cational branches e0 6= e through a change in ‘their’ qe0. The corresponding cross-education






ex:Again, due to a uniform ￿e, these
are the same for all e0 6= e. Comparing the direct- and cross- elasticities of complementar-
















ex > ￿x > ￿e, as in Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano & Peri (2006), then !N
ex < "N
ex,
meaning that native workers with education e are a closer q-substitute (in the sense of
Hamermesh) for immigrants with the same education than native workers with di￿erent
education. Indeed, conditional on z, immigrants across educational branches are always
q-complements to native workers.
In order to endogenize z, we now assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for the
10￿nal output good:
Y (K;L) = AL
1￿￿K
￿ with ￿ 2 [0;1]: (7)
This implies a unitary elasticity of substitution between L and capital K, dispensing
with the need of an estimation equation. Enforcing the equilibrium condition w = z =




exsexsesL, where sL denotes the overall wage share. The full general equilibrium



































e ￿ 1): (8c)
Note that "N
ex = sM
exsexse(1=￿e￿1) > 0 provided that ￿e > 1. Holding Y constant (i.e., ￿x-
ing an isoquant), the above elasticities may be interpreted as short-run elasticities. Alter-
natively, following Ottaviano & Peri (2006), one may want to take a long-run perspective
in assuming that endogenous capital accumulation ensures a constant marginal produc-
tivity of capital, and thus also of labor, in which case ￿
z





Notice also that !N
ex necessarily becomes negative if ￿M
ex ! 1.
If a country considers selective immigration restrictions, and if native wage e￿ects are
the dominating magnitude in the policy goal, then the elasticities in (8) would be the key
ingredient in any optimal policy calculus. Loosely speaking, policy would aim at high
quotas in segments ex where the complementarity e￿ects, as for instance captured by
"N
ex, are particularly high, acknowledging of course that the di￿erent elasticities in (8) are
highly interdependent. The positive wage e￿ects from a given immigration scenario for
some types of native workers, as reported in particular in Ottaviano & Peri (2006) stem
from such complementarities. A country aimed at a liberal immigration policy might
still be interested in compensating losers among the native labor force. Suppose that
liberalization of given restrictions leads to an equiproportional in￿ow of foreign workers
across all possible ex-types of labor. A one percent increase of LM
ex, across the board,
















While the elasticities in (8) look at di￿erent types of foreign workers extending q-complemen-
tarity (or -substitutability) e￿ects to native workers, elasticities ￿N
e0x0 look at di￿erent
11native workers receiving such e￿ects from an equiproportional increase in foreign worker
employment across all types of labor. We shall report both types of elasticities, based on
our estimation results below. They provide a nicely structured way to present the whole
system of empirical inverse labor demand functions of the economy { empirical analogues
to the gradients ~ LN
N and ~ LN
M considered above.
The inverse labor demand functions for native workers that derive from this approach
may be written in the following log-changes form, which takes a long-run perspective in

























The corresponding log-change for the foreign wage wM
ex simply replaces dln LN
ex with
dlnLM
ex, and the various aggregate labor inputs are de￿ned as above. Equations like
this will be used in our simulation exercise, where changes in employment of (composite)
labor on the right derive from the given immigration scenario, which implies changes in
labor supply, and from the reduced form estimates that translate this into employment
changes; see below.
2.2 Endogeneity concerns
Estimating the inverse labor demand functions as suggested above implies that we may
treat employment changes as exogenous. This is legitimate if there is full employment
throughout the entire sample period, and if all variation is driven by exogenous supply
shifts that are themselves independent of the sample-variation in wages. Let us assume
away unemployment for a moment. Then, any supply shift driven by changes in foreign
workers should be ￿ne, since a migrant’s ex-characteristic is predetermined. 10 However,
while workers cannot choose their ex-characteristics at the time of migration, they can
still choose the preferred destination country. This possibility is rarely discussed in the
literature. Hence, ex-cells of the labor market where wages rise strongly over the sample
may attract a relatively larger migrant in￿ow. Estimating (2) by OLS biases the estimate
10This is the main advantage of the Borjas-approach to earlier studies following the area-approach; see
Borjas et al. (1996, 1997).
12of j1=￿Mj towards zero, thereby leading to overestimation of substitutability between
natives and migrants. In the other speci￿cations, we may essentially run into similar
problems. However, in contrast to (2), we may run equations (4) or (6) on samples that
exclude migrant workers, which should at least reduce the bias, or relying on instrumental
variables techniques using native labor supply changes as instruments. 11
A separate endogeneity concern follows from non-market-clearing labor market insti-
tutions. According to the LNJ-paradigm of European unemployment, the labor market
adjusts to an equilibrium level of unemployment that simultaneously supports the real
wage implicit in the price-setting behavior of ￿rms, and the real wage implied by wage-
setting. In very general terms, a country’s goods and labor market institutions thus
simultaneously determine its equilibrium real wage and rate of unemployment. This im-
plies that the level of employment and the real wage are jointly determined by a country’s
institutions and labor supply. Thus, whatever the details of wage-setting, consistent es-
timation of our core parameters of labor demand may be guarded against this type of
endogeneity by relying on labor supplies as instruments for employment. 12 To the extent
that labor supplies are indeed exogenous, this IV-strategy delivers unbiased estimates for
substitution elasticities ￿M
e , ￿x and ￿e even in the presence of unemployment.
Another problem arises due to the fact that labor market institutions may reduce the
variance of wages (and employment) over time and across cells. This makes inference more
di￿cult, but does not, of course, invalidate estimation per se as long as some movement
on ￿rms’ labor demand schedules does take place.
2.3 Wage-setting and unemployment
The elasticities of inverse labor demand derived above relate to employment changes, not
changes in labor supply, which is what happens with immigration. We now use Mex and
Nex to denote native and immigrant labor supply, respectively. With non-market-clearing
labor market institutions we may not equate ￿ Mex = ￿LM
ex and ￿LN
ex = 0, assuming that
11Migration-induced labor supply changes may also su￿er from policy-induced endogeneity. If immi-
gration restrictions are binding, and if they are designed to cater domestic labor market requirements, as
often argued by policy makers, then any immigrant supply changes would be policy-induced and, thus,
endogenous to wages.
12Br￿ ucker & Jahn (2008) or D’Amuri et al. (2008) do not use instruments here.
13￿Nex = 0. We need a model that allows us to translate changes ￿ Mex from a ‘realistic’
immigration scenario into ￿LM
ex 6= ￿Mex and ￿LN
ex 6= 0, allowing for unemployment in line
with existing labor market institutions. These endogenous employment changes may then
be inserted into the estimated inverse labor demand functions, in order to back out the
general equilibrium wage e￿ects from the immigration scenario, alongside displacement
e￿ects ￿LN
ex < 0 and ￿LM
ex ￿ ￿Mex < 0.
In macroeconomic contexts, it has become customary to explain European unemploy-
ment through an interaction of price- and wage-setting; see Layard, Nickell & Jackman
(2005). Price-setting implies a relationship between price and marginal cost which is, in
turn, dependent on the wage rate. Under reasonable conditions, marginal cost depends
on employment, hence price setting implies a relationship between the real wage rate
and employment. At the same time, labor market institutions are assumed to depart
from market-clearing wage formation, such that the real wage rate depends on the rate of
unemployment. Labor market equilibrium then implies a natural rate of unemployment
which is consistent with both, price- and wage-setting. This framework is open to several
speci￿c interpretations. Indeed, as pointed out by Blanchard (2007), the set of interpre-
tations even includes a conventional view of labor demand and supply, implying a zero
natural rate of unemployment.
For the present purpose, we employ what Layard, Nickell & Jackman (2005) have
called \normal-cost price-setting". Assuming perfect competition on output markets,
prices are equal to marginal cost, and the negative price-setting-relationship between the
real wage rate and the rate of unemployment then derives from the presence of a ￿xed
non-labor input like the capital stock. In our case, we thus arrive at several di￿erent
price-setting relationships, coinciding with the inverse labor demand functions presented
in the preceding section. More speci￿cally, normalizing the output price to one, and given
labor supplies for all types of labor, the level-version of equation (10) implies a relationship
between the real wage rate for labor-type ex and the rates of unemployment for all types of
labor. A similar relationship may be derived for an environment where producers are faced
with exogenous shocks to labor productivity and ￿ring cost; see Angrist & Kugler (2003).
This introduces a wedge between the wage rate and the marginal value productivity of
labor. Our entire story is una￿ected by this type of labor market imperfection, provided
that this wedge is constant.
Wage-setting, in turn, may be formulated through conventional upward-sloping la-
bor supply schedules, as for instance in Angrist & Kugler (2003) and D’Amuri et al.





￿￿ Nex for native labor, and a corresponding expression for foreigners, with a
uniform parameter ￿ > 0). In this equation, r denotes the replacement rate for unemploy-
ment bene￿ts. Alternatively, and more in line with Layard, Nickell & Jackman (2005) 13,
the above equation might be written as
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and interpreted as a proper wage-setting equation. In this formulation, ￿ wN
ex is a refer-
ence wage for wage-setting. 14 In contrast to the conventional macroeconomic framework,
this assumes that wage-setting takes place on a disaggregate-level, responding to the
education-experience-related rates of unemployment for native labor uN
ex.15 Assuming a
uniform ￿ across all educational and experience levels implies a uniform responsiveness
of wage-setting behavior to changes in unemployment levels. This is a convenient iden-
tifying restriction, but it also makes sense for a country like Germany, with centralized
labor market institutions. Depending on how foreign workers are covered by labor market
institutions, a corresponding equation may or may not hold for foreign workers (with the
same, or with a di￿erent parameters ￿). In our empirical implementation, we allow for ￿
to vary between native and foreign workers (denoted by ￿M and ￿N; respectively).
Researchers have followed di￿erent strategies towards empirical implementation of
this approach. Thus, Angrist & Kugler estimate equations explaining the employment-
to-population ratio ( LN=N in our notation) by the immigrant share in the labor force for
di￿erent immigration countries and certain segments of their labor markets (female/male
and age groups).16 These equations are reduced form relationships that follow from equat-
ing the wage rate from the inverse labor demand functions (price setting) with the wage
rate from wage-setting. D’Amuri et al. (2008) follow a similar approach against the back-
drop of an experience- and education-based nesting of labor demand. This then allows
13See also Blanch￿ower & Oswald (2005).
14If this reference wage is set equal to the market clearing wage rate for ex-type labor, and if r = 0,
then the natural rate of unemployment is zero for all types of labor.
15In the macroeconomic context, wage setting normally relies on expected goods prices. The above
formulation assumes perfect foresight, or a long-run equilibrium, where price expectations are borne out.
Moreover, the output price is normalized to 1.
16Angrist & Kugler (2003) do not follow the Borjas (2003) approach, but remain within the \area-
approach", treating di￿erent western European countries as \areas".
15them to augment equation (10) by induced employment changes for natives when using
this equation in order to simulate wage e￿ects from immigration. In their simulations for
German immigration, D’Amuri et al. (2008) use estimates on German data only for ￿M;
while relying on estimates for ￿x and ￿e obtained for the US.17
We follow a di￿erent approach in that all relevant elasticities of substitution are esti-
mated on German data, and we use the same data set to also estimate the wage-setting
parameter ￿, which is then used for simulation. More speci￿cally, our estimation equation














ext￿1 + ￿ext (12)
where ￿ext is an error term.18 In this speci￿cation, ￿N = 1=￿N which we expect to be
positive from theory. The lagged wage is added to allow for lagged adjustment, with a
long-run elasticity of ￿N=(1￿￿). Not shown in (12), we also take into account education-
speci￿c time trends and squared education-speci￿c time trends, to take into account
exogenous long-run changes in reference wages ￿ wN
ex in (11).
For a better understanding of our simulation results below, we brie￿y look at the wage
and employment e￿ects of a certain immigration d Mex, assuming zero immigration for all
other types of labor, and assuming dNex = 0 throughout. Returning to the elasticities of





the elasticity of complementarity between foreign and native labor, where !N
ex captures the
reverse complementarity between native and foreign labor, as given in (8a). By analogy




ex￿1=￿M < 0 as the direct elasticity of native wages with respect




ex ￿1=￿M < 0 for the corresponding elasticity
of wages for foreigners. 19 With these de￿nitions, we may use equation (10) above to write
dlnwN









ex (note that ! are
cross-elasticities). Assuming constant institutional variables ￿ wN
ex; ￿ wM
ex, rN and rM and a
17In addition to the nesting introduced above, D’Amuri et al. (2008) allow for imperfect substitutability
between old and new immigrants. However, their data suggest a close to in￿nity elasticity of substitution
on this lowest level.
18In the relevant table below, we also report estimates for an alternative equation with the unemploy-







. Equation (12) allows for a more convenient formulation of numerical
simulation below.
19The sign of the own-elasticities, ~ !
N
ex < 0 and ~ !
M
ex < 0, follows from concavity of the production
function; see Hamermesh (1993).
16constant native labor force, wage-setting implies dln wN
ex = ￿NdlnLN
ex, as well as dln wM
ex =
￿MdlnLM
ex. These four equations determine equilibrium reactions of wages and employ-
ment for natives and foreigners. For the simpler case where wage-setting is restricted
to native labor (Walrasian labor markets for immigrants) we have dln LM
ex =dlnMex,










ex=￿N < 0 and
￿
1 ￿ ~ !N
ex=￿N￿
> 1; wage-setting moderates the partial equilibrium wage
e￿ects of immigration, relative to the reference case of Walrasian labor markets where
dlnwN
ex = !N
exdlnMex. Inserting back into the wage-setting equation, the native employ-






￿N ￿ ~ !N
ex
￿￿
dlnMex. Note that ￿N ￿ ~ !N
ex > 0.
Hence, native employment of ex-type workers rises, if there is q-complementarity between
natives and foreigners, !N
ex > 0, and vice versa; see also Angrist & Kugler (2003). The
intuition is that q-complementarity implies a rise in the marginal productivity of native
labor at the initial level of native employment. For a rise in native wages to be consis-
tent with the wage-setting constraint, there must be an o￿setting increase in employment
(lower unemployment). This, in turn, moderates the wage e￿ect, relative to the Wal-
rasian case. If there is q-substitutability, by the same argument there must be a fall in
employment, leading to a less severe wage cut than would obtain in the Walrasian case.
In our simulation below, we have a system of E ￿ X estimated inverse labor demand
equations for natives (including all cross-e￿ects from education experience and natives),
plus corresponding equations for foreigners. In addition, we have E ￿ X estimated wage
curves for natives as well as for foreigners. This, of course, generates a complex pattern of
interactions which is amenable to solution only via numerical methods. The results give
us employment (or unemployment) as well as wage e￿ects, which reported below.
3 Data
In order to implement the empirical strategy discussed in section 2, we require micro-level
data on individuals’ wage rates and labor market status (employed, unemployed, out of
labor force) as well as characteristics such as the education, work experience, and whether
he or she is a migrant or a native. Typically, researchers draw on census data (Borjas,
2003; Ottaviano & Peri, 2005, 2006; Aydemir and Borjas, 2007), or social security data
(Bonin, 2005; Br￿ ucker & Jahn, 2007). We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
to obtain information about wages. We use the German micro-census for reliable data
on the size and time evolution of our education-experience-place of birth labor market
17cells.20 We do have social security data for Germany (the IABS database), but this data
set has a number of important short-comings.
The SOEP, published by the DIW, Berlin21 is a large longitudinal panel data set with
a wide range of personal, household and family speci￿c micro-data, collected by face-
to-face interviews with all family members over 16 years, and covering natives as well
as foreigners/immigrants. Interviews have been repeated annually, starting in 1984, with
sample refreshment or extensions taking place in 1990, 1994-95, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2006.
The DIW generates year-speci￿c weights for certain individual characteristics, based on
micro-census data, which allow us to treat data between sample refreshments/extensions
as being representative for the entire German population (including new states after
uni￿cation). The sample size is relatively small, including about 12,000 households and
20.000 persons, but the SOEP data set o￿ers a number of unique advantages.
First, the SOEP allows to de￿ne as immigrants individuals born outside of Germany.
O￿cial German data or social security data usually uses nationality as a criterion to
distinguish natives and immigrants. In that case, the status of individuals depends on
the volatile nature of naturalization policy. 22 Moreover, successful naturalization depends
also on the e￿orts of immigrants and, hence, may be endogenous, while the foreign-born
criterion is clearly exogenous.
Second, the SOEP provides information about education of individuals in line with
the International Standard Classi￿cation of Education adopted by the UNESCO in 1997
(ISCED-97). This classi￿cation allows to deal with the peculiarities of the German ed-
ucation system, e.g., the role of the apprenticeship system. Other data bases measure
education by years of schooling, which makes meaningful comparisons across countries
20The micro-census does not provide data on wages. Manacorda et al. (2006) use a similar strategy
in their study for for UK, combining the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and the General Household Survey
(GHS)).
21See http://www.diw.de/english/sop/index.html for details.
22O￿cial German statistics (and the IABS) de￿ne migrants according to citizenship ( ius sanguis prin-
ciple). Traditionally, naturalization rates have been extremely low in Germany, so that children of
immigrants often do not have the German citizenship. Moreover, the naturalization law has changed
drastically in 1999. On the other hand, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, almost two million ethnic
Germans migrated to Germany and - according to ius sanguis rules - immediately quali￿ed for German
citizenship.
18with di￿erent education systems di￿cult. 23
Third, the SOEP directly reports the experience of workers and even di￿erentiates
between experience earned in full-time and part-time jobs. This is a unique advantage
compared to US census data or the IABS, where experience needs to be approximated
by time elapsed since an individual has left school. This measure is obviously distorted
by possible unemployment spells or maternity leaves, so that the literature (e.g., Borjas,
2003) uses only male workers.
Fourth, and most importantly, the SOEP reports gross wages on an monthly basis
without any censoring. Using information on working hours per week, we calculate hourly
wages. Data based on social security records (e.g., the IABS) do not provide information
on wages for workers with wages below or above some (time-moving) threshold and require
substantial imputation.
We cluster workers into di￿erent education and experience groups. Recall that the
number of observations available for our regressions directly depends on the number of
those groups (N = T ￿ X ￿ E); so that a ￿ner classi￿cation grid drives up the sample
size. However, the larger X or E become, the smaller the number of observations (in
particular those for migrants) in each cell. Hence, the de￿nition of education-experience
cells requires to trade-o￿ cell-speci￿c sample sizes against the number of observations
available to run our regressions. Having data from 1984-2005, and setting X = E = 4; we
have a perfectly balanced sample of 352 observations (704 when di￿erentiating between
migrants and natives).
The four education groups are de￿ned as follows: ISCED-levels 0 through 2 (lower
secondary education or second stage of basic education), ISCED-level 3 (upper secondary
education), ISCED-levels 4 and 5 (post-secondary up to ￿rst stage tertiary education),
and ISCED-level 6 (second stage tertiary education). Regarding experience, we take the
sum of observed full-time and part-time experience and use four categories, each covering
a span of 10 years, up to a maximum of 40 years.
23For example, the French high school system allows for professional education (the Bac-pro); individ-
uals enrolled in this system are treated as students. In Germany, a similar educational aim is achieved
outside the high school system through the apprenticeship scheme (or dual education system). If educa-
tion is measured by years of schooling, the two systems would assign di￿erent values to a student who
achieves the same objective.
19Our time span goes back beyond German uni￿cation in 1990. Therefore, we restrict
our observations to the western part of Germany, but treat persons born in the eastern
part as German natives. This implies that around uni￿cation internal migration from
the eastern to the western part of Germany provides a truly exogenous, experiment-like
variation of labor supply across experience levels and educational groups.
Table 1 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics of our data set. Over the
years, the average cell size for the computation of wage or unemployment averages is 76
for migrants and 194 for natives. Some cells typically have only very few observations, in
particular those for migrants with high education and experience levels in early years of our
study. This is despite the over-sampling of migrants used by the SOEP and constitutes a
disadvantage of our data. However, since the SOEP is matched to micro-census data, cell
sizes and their time variance are representative. On average over 1984-2005, in Western
Germany, there are about 28.4 million full-time employed workers; 3.8 million thereof are
migrants (de￿ned as foreign-born and/or with foreign nationality). The last column of the
table reports the total change from 1984 to 2004 of the cell-sizes as reported in the micro
census. Clearly, there is a large amount of time variation for both the immigrant and the
native populations. This variation allows identi￿cation of our parameters of interest.
4 Estimation and Simulation Results
We ￿rst present estimates of the key labor demand parameters, as well as estimates of
the reduced form which incorporates non-Walrasian wage-setting and unemployment. We
also depict a detailed picture of q-complementarity and substitutability between native
and foreign workers. Subsequently, we introduce a ‘realistic’ counterfactual scenario of
German immigration and use our parameter estimates to calculate the pains and gains
that Germany has foregone by opting for immigration restrictions through the transitional
agreements in the recent eastern enlargement of the EU.
Table 2 presents estimates of the various elasticities of substitution that govern la-
bor demand. Our baseline speci￿cation accounts for endogeneity by instrumenting labor
demand by labor supply. The remaining columns contain robustness checks. Rows 1
through 5 address the elasticity of substitution between natives and migrants. For the
baseline speci￿cation we ￿nd 1=^ ￿
M = 0:136 with a robust standard error of 0 :04, which
implies an elasticity value of 7:4. Rows 2 through 5 allow for education-speci￿c elas-
20ticities ^ ￿
M
e , revealing some variation across educational branches. 24 The elasticity ￿M
importantly determines how an economy absorbs immigration. For instance, a relatively
low estimated value of ￿M drives the complementarity e￿ects behind the native wage in-
creases calculated by Ottaviano & Peri (2006). Arguing for a di￿erent slicing of the labor
market, Borjas & Hanson (2008) question ￿M-estimates below in￿nity for the US. Our
estimates in table 2 do indicate that natives and migrants are somewhat closer substitutes
for each other in Germany than in the US or the UK [see Manacorda et al. (2006)], but
with an elasticity of substitution well below in￿nity. This is in line with the results of
Br￿ ucker & Jahn (2008) and D’Amuri et al. (2008) who also ￿nd larger elasticities. We
interpret this as indicating a certain degree of unobserved heterogeneity across native and
foreign workers even within a given ex-cell. By and large, our ￿nding of a fairly large,
yet ￿nite elasticity of substitution ^ ￿
M survives the robustness checks reported in table 2.
This also holds true for the pattern of heterogeneity across educational groups, with the
exception of an alternative de￿nition of migrant status (column 7) which we know to be
less appropriate a priori; see above.
Line 6 turns to 1=￿x; the elasticity of substitution across experience levels. Our es-
timates are not statistically distinguishable from zero, hence we are unable to reject the
hypothesis of ￿x ! 1. US studies have found much lower values of this elasticity, also
well below the estimates for ￿M; as perhaps expected from intuition 25 A value of ￿x > ￿M
has important implications on the pattern of complementarity which we shall highlight
below. Manacorda et al. obtain ^ ￿
x > ^ ￿
M
e for the UK, as we do for Germany, but with
an estimated value for ￿x which is clearly much smaller than in￿nity. Large estimates
for ￿x (in the vicinity of 30) have also been found by Br￿ ucker & Jahn (2008) who use
German social security data. Both the magnitudes and the rank order of the estimated
elasticities indicate that Germany and the US are di￿erent in how immigration is ab-
sorbed in the labor market. In our framework the di￿erence must be interpreted as a
di￿erence in technology which, in turn, may re￿ect di￿erent patterns of specialization, as
24In particular, the top level of education (ISCED 6) exhibits an elasticity in the vicinity of 4, while for
lower level of education the elasticity is in the vicinity of 10. The large di￿erence between the elasticities
for ISCED 4+5 and ISCED 6 and the insigni￿cant estimate for ISCED 4+5 are probably due to the
fact that ISCED 4+5 mainly contains degrees that are speci￿c to the German educational system. This
means that most foreigners in this group have been educated in Germany.
25Borjas assumes ￿M ! 1; and he estimates values ￿x = 3:5 and ￿e = 1:3, while Ottaviano & Peri
estimates ￿M-values between 5 and 10, ￿evalues between 3 and 5, and ￿e-values around 2.
21well as deep-lying di￿erences in the educational system and other institutional features.
A higher ￿x-value for Germany than the US is also consistent with the empirical obser-
vation of relatively large German unemployment among older people. In our numerical
simulation below, we shall set ￿x = 100, which is consistent with our estimation result,
while retaining computability of the model. It should be noted that an in￿nite value
of ￿x is perfectly consistent with more experienced workers being more productive (in
a Harrod-neutral sense) than less experienced ones, thus also receiving higher wages. It
is also worth mentioning that D’Amuri et al. (2008), in their simulations for Germany,
do not use a ￿x-elasticity value estimated on German data, but use the estimates from
Ottaviano and Peri (2006) for the USA. 26
Concerning the elasticity of substitution across educational groups, our baseline esti-
mate is 1=^ ￿
e = 0:218, with a standard error of 0:047: Hence, ^ ￿
e is approximately equal to
4:6; which is somewhat larger than the estimates reported by Borjas (2003), Ottaviano &
Peri (2006) and Aydemir & Borjas (2007), but in line with estimates obtained by Br￿ ucker
& Jahn (2008) for Germany. As with ￿x; D’Amuri et al. (2008) use US-estimates in their
simulation for Germany. Our robustness checks in columns (2) to (7) of table 2 point
towards a fairly consistent picture, with ^ ￿
e = 4:6 a reasonable middle ground.
Overall, then, the di￿erent types of labor considered here for the German economy
feature a larger degree of substitutability in production than was found for a similar
disaggregation of the US and UK labor markets. Note that our empirical strategy is
consistent also with non-Walrasian labor market features, as already emphasized above.
Hence, our estimated elasticities of substitution re￿ect the technological environment.
This will be combined with the institutional feature of wage-setting below. The ￿nding
of large elasticities is interesting and has wide-reaching implications beyond the e￿ects
of immigration. We relegate the analysis of the causes of the cross-country di￿erences to
future work.
What do the estimated elasticities imply in terms of complementarity between German
and foreign workers? We may use the estimates to construct the various elasticities of
q-complementarity (8) that we have introduced in section 2 above. They are presented in
table 3. In order to make our numbers comparable to those of Borjas (2003), we re-de￿ne
26Our results suggest that using US estimates is problematic, since elasticities of substitution appear
substantially larger in Germany than in the US. Br￿ ucker & Jahn (2008) ￿nd a similar result.
22the elasticities so that they relate to percentage employment changes in composite ex-
type labor Lex, instead of percentage changes in LM
ex. I.e., we divide all elasticities de￿ned
in (8) above through sM
ex. The policy interpretation of these elasticities is as follows.
Within columns 1 through 3, a row-wise reading of Table 3 would give useful information
for a policy maker who aims at a maximum degree of q-complementarity in designing
an immigration quota system based on educational attainment and experience of foreign
workers. The elasticities depict the q-complementarity that immigrants with di￿erent ex-
characteristics would extend to natives with the same characteristics, as well as natives
with di￿erent experience levels and natives with di￿erent educational attainments. In
all cases q-complementarity is measured as the percentage increase in native wages wN
ex
relative to a 1 percent increase in employment of composite labor Lex.
Notice that the direct elasticities reported in Table 3 are much lower in absolute
value than in Borjas (2003), indeed even positive in a number of cases. The reason is
a direct complementarity that arises from imperfect substitution between foreign and
native workers within any one ex-group. Notice also that there is less complementarity
across experience levels than within the corresponding ex-branch, which re￿ects the rank
order of our estimated elasticities. 27 By way of example, a migration-induced 10 percent
increase in Lex for e = 1 (ISCED 1-2 ) and x = 1 (0 - 10 years) depresses wages of natives
with e = 1 but x 6= 1 by 0:18 percent. Analogous interpretations hold for elasticities
across educational attainments (column 3). The ￿nal column of Table 3 takes a di￿erent
perspective in looking at how much q-complementarity native workers with di￿erent ex-
characteristics would receive from an equiproportional in￿ow of foreign workers across all
ex-cells of the labor market. It indicates, for instance, that a uniform 10 percent increase
in Lex brought about by immigration depresses wages of native workers with e = 1 and
x = 1 by 0:94 percent, while native workers with e = 3 (ISCED 4-5) and x = 4 (￿ 31
years) would face a 0:86 percent wage cut.
Table 4 takes us one step further towards a simulation exercise by reporting estimated
parameters of equation (12) which represents wage-setting. For easier comparison with
27The direct elasticity of q-complementarity is de￿ned as !N
ex = sM







. Our rank-order for the elasticities of substitution is ￿x > ￿M
e > ￿e > 1, which
explains the somewhat counter-intuitive result that !N
ex is positive for some ex; and consistently higher




exsex (1/￿x ￿ 1/￿e),
while for an analogous reason "N
ex = sM
exsexse(1=￿e ￿ 1) is consistently lower than ￿
N
ex.
23the literature, we have also run estimations on the unemployment rate instead of the log
employment ratio. We report short-run estimates obtained including a lagged dependent
variable, and long-run estimates ￿=(1 ￿ ￿). Our baseline uses pooled regression, where
we estimate an ￿-value of 0:08 in the short-run, and a long-run value of 0:55 in the
long-run. Comparing with Br￿ ucker & Jahn (2008), who use individual-speci￿c e￿ects,
we estimate a somewhat larger sensitivity of wage-setting with respect to unemployment.
Our robustness checks in table 4 reveal that individual-speci￿c e￿ects using Arellano-
Bond an conventional ￿xed e￿ects reveals estimates that are broadly in line Br￿ ucker &
Jahn (2008).
We can now enter a simulation experiment. Our scenario is motivated by the recent
eastern enlargement of the EU where Germany, along with all other incumbent countries
except the UK, Sweden and Ireland, has opted for keeping its bilateral import restrictions
on migration from new member countries, as provided for by the so-called transitional
agreements. It is well known that the migration ￿ow from new member countries to the
UK has turned out to be larger than expected prior to the enlargement in 2004. The
guiding assumption for our ￿rst scenario is that without the transitional agreement the
German economy would have received the ￿ows that have now ended up in the UK. This
is, of course, a rough ‘guesstimate’, but it serves our purpose well. It is probably a lower
bound for the counterfactual of enlargement without a German transitional agreement
on immigration. Using British Labour force surveys (LFS) for the forth quarters of 2003
and 2006, we have calculated the skill distribution of the immigrant labor force from the
new EU member states in the UK. The ISCED levels are derived according to the LFS
Users Guide (2006). The distinction between ISCED 5 and 6 di￿ers from the one in the
GSOEP. As ISCED 4+5 are mainly speci￿c German degrees, we assume that all persons
with ISCED 4-6 have ISCED 6. Experience is calculated as age ￿16 for ISCED 0-2,
age￿19 for ISCED 3 and age￿22 for ISCED 4-6. Moreover, we replace negative changes
in the highest experience group by zero, as this probably re￿ects a mere cohort e￿ect.
Overall, we calculate an increase in the labor force by about 290,000 people. Details are
found in table 5.
We also construct an upper bound scenario for immigration from new EU member
states. Sinn et al. (2001) estimate an overall German immigration potential from new EU
members equal 4 mio people.28 This number is about 12 times larger than the migration
28See Zaiceva (2006) for an overview of various estimates of the migration potential from new EU
24￿ow from new member states into the UK in the last years. Hence, our upper-bound
scenario scales up the lower bound by a factor of 12. The di￿erence between the lower
and upper bound may seem disturbingly large, but it is still a useful exercise. Moreover,
it is plausible that the composition of migrants would have been more strongly biased
towards individuals with low education and experience levels, if the migrant ￿ow had
approached the upper bound. Table 5 presents the end-of-sample (2004) numbers and
shares of foreign workers in the 16 ex-cells of the German labor market, as well as the
increase in foreign workers according to our counterfactual scenarios. The increases are
expressed in absolute numbers, as well as in percentage increases of Mex and (Mex+Nex),
respectively.
Tables 6 and 7 present simulation results for the case where we use education-speci￿c
elasticities ￿M
e . Summarizing table 6, which depicts the lower-bound immigration sce-
nario, we may state the following. First, looking at the reference case of perfect labor
markets, we do not detect an aggregate complementarity e￿ect for natives, although wage
cuts are moderate. The brunt of adjustment lies with pre-existing immigrants, but this
is ameliorated through capital accumulation, which even turns wage cuts into long-run
gains for natives. Allowing for unemployment due to wage-setting, we observe a di￿er-
ent pattern. Note that our numerical solution is based on the pooled OLS estimates for
the wage elasticity ￿ reported in table 4. In the short-run, foreigners e￿ectively receive
substantial wage protection, but this comes at the expense of employment, with more
than half the in￿ow initially unemployed. In the long-run, with a higher estimated elas-
ticity value for ￿, migrants e￿ectively lose much of this protection. Lost wage protection
overcompensates the complementarity e￿ect from capital accumulation, with only a mod-
erate unemployment e￿ect remaining in the long-run, coupled with a stronger wage cut.
In other words, short-run wage protection leads to a large deviation from the reference
case of perfect labor markets, whereas in the long-run, with a higher wage-elasticity ￿,
the wage-setting equilibrium approaches the full employment equilibrium. The full em-
ployment equilibrium features a lower wage cut for the long-run than the short-run, as
expected. With wage setting, however, the short-run equilibrium features a protective
e￿ect from wage-setting, which is particularly strong for foreigners. Indeed, it makes the
short-run equilibrium look more attractive to immigrants than the long-run equilibrium,
which features the bene￿t of capital accumulation, but also the partial loss of wage pro-
member states.
25tection. For natives, lost wage protection applies in the long-run as well, but in a modi￿ed
way. For perfect labor markets, capital accumulation turns the native wage cut to a long-
run wage increase. Wage-setting then implies higher employment and lower wages than
would be the case with a perfect labor market. But unlike foreigners, natives still ￿nd a
more favorable e￿ect of immigration in the the long-run than in the short-run.
Not surprisingly, our upper bound scenario delivers much higher numbers, as evidenced
by table 7. Immigration now amounts to an increase in the German workforce by as much
as 10 percent (table 5). This is comparable to the scenarios considered by Borjas (2003)
or Ottaviano and Peri (2006), who simulate an 11 percent increase in the US labor force.
Importantly, we ￿nd that increasing the magnitude of the shock does not overturn the
qualitative pattern of our results. Thus, unlike Felbermayr & Kohler (2007), we ￿nd wage
adjustment to be monotonic in the magnitude of foreign labor in￿ow. For the upper-bound
scenario as well, our results suggest that pre-existing immigrants have to bear the main
brunt of adjustment. In the short-run, their unemployment rate increases by about 19
percentage points. In the long-run, with the domestic capital stock adjusting to keep the
marginal productivity of overall labor L constant, it is still 3:4 percentage points above
the initial level. Moreover, immigrant wages fall by 3 :3 percent in the short-run, and by
5:8 percent in the long-run, due to a lower degree of wage protection received from wage-
setting. In the short-run, the average native su￿ers a 0 :2 percent wage cut, which is turned
into a 0:6 wage gain in the long-run. For natives too, the short-run e￿ect features a higher
rate of unemployment, increasing by 1:7 percentage points for the average native, and by
2:0 percentage points for low-skilled natives. However, the long-run perspective looks
much brighter, with unemployment going down by 1 percentage point for the average
native worker. Thus, for natives the complementarity gain from capital accumulation
dominats the partial loss of wage protection.
Table 8 repeats the simulation exercise, now assuming a uniform value of 7 :4 for the
elasticity between natives and foreigners, instead of education-speci￿c ￿M
e -values. The
simulation results do not change in any important way, except perhaps for the fact that
the negative e￿ects on low-skilled workers are now clearly stronger, and the ones for high
skilled workers are somewhat weaker.
The wage and unemployment e￿ects from this immigration counterfactual may be
seen as the pains that the German economy was spared through opting for transitional
immigration restrictions in eastern EU enlargement. What, then, are the gains forgone?
Our simulation results enable us to also calculate the welfare e￿ects from the counterfac-
26tual immigration scenario. In section 2 above, we have argued that with perfect labor
markets the welfare e￿ects for native labor may be approximated by NTdwN; where
vectors N and wN denote native labor supply and wages, respectively, for our 16 di￿er-
ent types of education and experience levels (T indicating vector transposition). With
labor market imperfections leading to changes in native employment, the welfare e￿ect









d~ LM ￿ d ~ M
￿
, where d~ LM denotes the general equilibrium e￿ect
of immigration on employment of pre-existing foreign workers. Table 9 depicts the results
for the wage-setting case with unemployment for both, the lower-bound-scenario and the
upper-bound scenario. We add the percentage e￿ect on capital income to complete the
picture. In the short-run both, natives and foreigners, have to su￿er a welfare loss. In
the long-run natives gain from immigration and this welfare gain outweighs the welfare
loss of former immigrated foreigners. As expected the e￿ects are much larger for the
upper-bound scenario than the lower-bound one. Gains for capital owners are calculated
according to (1 ￿ ￿)dlnL, from the Cobb-Douglas marginal productivity condition. This
is a lower bound, because it ignores the triangular gain deriving from capital accumula-
tion. At the same time, however, it ignores discounting which works in the other direction.
The negative short-run e￿ect for natives seems to negate the familiar immigration surplus.
However, as we have shown in Felbermayr & Kohler (2007), with pre-existing foreign la-
bor, this surplus may be negative. This case obtains in the short-, but not in the long-run.
In addition, these results are based on a non-labor-market-clearing adjustment through
wage-setting, as opposed to the neoclassical case underlying the immigration surplus.
5 Conclusions
There is much controversy about immigration policy, in Germany and elsewhere. This
re￿ects di￿erent views and interests, but it also re￿ects a considerable amount of uncer-
tainty about the e￿ects of immigration. Any increase in the domestic labor force should,
other things equal, exert a downward pressure on domestic wages. However, with well
functioning labor markets, it should at the same time increase welfare of natives as a
whole. But with labor market imperfections, there might also be a rise in unemploy-
ment. Fear of unwelcome wage and employment e￿ects leads many countries to run
highly restrictive immigration policies. It has also lead the majority of EU countries to
27opt for maintaining restrictions on immigration vis a vis new member countries under the
so-called transitional arrangement.
Germany was among the countries taking a restrictive stance on migration from new
member countries, invoking the transitional arrangement agreed upon in the negotiations
leading up to eastern enlargement in 2004. At the time, uncertainty about the e￿ects of
immigration as such was aggravated by uncertainty about the likely size and composition
of the labor in￿ow that would follow from implementing the single-market-freedom of
labor migration. In this paper, we have attempted to ￿ll this void, proceeding in three
steps. First, we have estimated a structural model of labor demand focusing on worker ex-
perience and education. Our model is borrowed from Borjas (2003). Following Ottaviano
& Peri (2006) and Manacorda et al. (2006) we allow for imperfect substitution between
foreign and native workers with the same level of experience and education. Unlike these
other studies, however, we allowed for unemployment. In particular, we embed our struc-
tural view of labor demand in a price-wage-setting framework of the type proposed by
Layard, Nickell & Jackman (2005) to understand European unemployment. We estimate
a suitably speci￿ed wage-setting equation, which then allows us to establish disaggregate
relationships between changes in labor supply and changes in employment. In the third
step, we rely on observed migration into the UK, in order to construct a counterfactual
\free-movement scenario" of EU enlargement for Germany, and we use our econometric
estimates for labor demand parameters and the estimated wage-setting equation, in order
to simulate the wage and employment e￿ects of this counterfactual.
Our econometric results suggest that, even for a fairly ￿ne grid of education and ex-
perience levels, natives and foreigners are imperfect substitutes in German labor demand.
The estimated elasticity of substitution varies somewhat across educational levels, but the
majority of estimated elasticity values are below 10. Workers with di￿erent experience
levels, however, are revealed to be almost perfect substitutes. This is a particular aspect
where our results di￿er vastly from those for other countries, but they are in line with
other evidence for Germany. Our estimate for the elasticity of substitution across di￿erent
educational attainments is in the vicinity of 4, which is also somewhat larger than the
estimates found for other countries, but signi￿cantly lower than the elasticity of substi-
tution between German natives and foreigners. These elasticity values imply a particular
pattern of complementarity between migrants and German native workers, both within
and across educational and experience groups. While imperfect substitutability between
natives and foreigners generally favors complementarity, higher elasticities of substitution
28across experience and educational groups tend to work in the opposite direction for a
given immigration scenario.
Combining these elasticity estimates with the wage-setting estimates allows us to see
what all of this implies for a particular immigration scenario. We address a scenario
which is motivated by the recent eastern enlargement of the EU. It basically assumes
that, absent transitional restrictions, Germany would have attracted immigration from
new member countries comparable in size and composition to the in￿ow observed for
the UK. This gives us a 6 percent increase in the total migrant work force for Germany,
which we treat as a lower-bound-scenario. Scaling-up this scenario in line with extraneous
estimates for the entire migration potential from eastern enlargement, we also construct an
upper-bound-scenario where the migrant labor force increases by as much as 70 percent.
In each case the ￿ow is composed unevenly across educational branches, with a more than
proportional ￿ow for low-skilled immigration.
We compare results obtained under wage-setting with the reference case of perfect
labor markets. According to our simulation, the 6 percent in￿ow of the lower-bound-
scenario would generate an average short-run reduction of native wages by a mere 0.35
percent, with a less than average cut of 0.30 percent for high-skilled labor, and a cut of 0.39
percent for high-skilled natives. For foreign workers, the cuts are more pronounced, with
1.02 percent on average, and 1.31 percent (0.70 percent) for low-skilled (high-skilled) labor.
In the long-run, with capital stocks adjusting to restore the initial marginal productivity
of capital, the wage e￿ects for natives turn into a gain by 0.07 percent for the average
native. These are rather moderate e￿ects, due to the small size of the shock considered.
Scaling the shock up to the upper-bound-scenario, we arrive at short-run e￿ects which
are quite close to those reported by Borjas (2003), equal to a 4.16 percent wage cut for
natives, despite imperfect substitutability between natives and foreigners. In the long-
run, we again observe a wage increase for natives, as in Ottaviano & Peri (2006), but
much less pronounced, with an average increase of 0.78 percent, which is about a third of
the gain calculated by Ottaviano & Peri for the US. Finally, we calculate the wage and
employment e￿ects from our migration scenarios under the more realistic assumption of
wage-setting with unemployment. By and large, we do observe the expected mitigation
e￿ect of wage setting on the wage e￿ects that we have identi￿ed on a theoretical level.
Summarizing our results in a nutshell, relatively high substitution elasticities across
educational attainments, and particularly across experience levels, limit the scope for
complementarity between natives and immigrant workers. The lower-bound scenario for
29unrestricted labor movement from new member countries yields very small negative wage
and employment e￿ects for natives in the short-run, but no unemployment e￿ects and
moderate wage gains in the long-run. For an upper-bound scenario, the short-run wage
e￿ects are broadly comparable to those found by Borjas (2003) for the US, despite the
fact that our results reveal imperfect substitutability between native and foreign labor.
The long-run wage gains are signi￿cantly smaller than those obtained by Ottaviano &
Peri (2006) for the US.
30References
[1] Angrist, Joshua D. and Adriana D. Kugler (2003), \Protective or Couter-Productive?
Labour Market Institutions and the E￿ect of Immigraiton on EU Natives" in
Econoimc Journal 113 (June), F302-F331.
[2] Aydemir, Abdurrahman, George J. Borjas (2007). "Cross-Country Variation in the Impact
of International Migration: Canada, Mexico, and the United States" in Journal of the
European Economic Association 5 (4), 663|708.
[3] Berry, Albert R. and Ronald Soligo (1969). \Some Welfare Aspects of International Migra-
tion"in Journal of Political Economy 7 (5), 778-794.
[4] Blanchard, Olivier (2006). \European unemployment: the evolution of facts and
ideas"in Economic Policy 21 (45), 5-59.
[5] Blanchard, Olivier (2007). \A Review of Richard Layard, Stephen Nickell, and Richard
Jackman’s Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market’ " in Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 45 (2), 410-418.
[6] Blanch￿ower, David G. and Andrew J. Oswald (2005), The Wage Curve Reloaded,
NBER Working Paper No. 11338, Cambridge, MA.
[7] Bonin, Holger (2005). Wage and Employment E￿ects of Immigration to Germany: Evidence
from a Skill Group Appraoch, IZA Discussion Paper 1875, Bonn.
[8] Borjas, George J. (1995). \The Economic Bene￿ts from Immigration" in Journal of Eco-
nomics Perspectives, 9 (2), 3-22.
[9] Borjas, Geroge J. (1999). \The Economic Analysis of Immigration," in O. Ashenfelter and
D. Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics 3A, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science BV,, Ch.
28.
[10] Borjas, George J. (2003). \The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining
the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market" in Quarterly Journal of Economics,
CXVIII (4), 1335-1374.
[11] Borjas, George J., Richard Freeman and Larry Katz (1996). \Searching for the e￿ect of
Immigration on the Labor Market" in American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings ,
86 (2), 246-251.
31[12] Borjas, George J., Richard Freeman and Larry Katz (1997). \Imperfect Substitution be-
tween Nativess and Foreigers: A Reappraisal" in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity ,
1997 (1), 1-90.
[13] Borjas, George J., Je￿rey Grogger and Gordon H. Hanson (2008). \How Much do Immi-
gration and Trade A￿ect Labor Market Outcomes?" NBER Working Paper No. 13887,
Cambridge, MA.
[14] Br￿ ucker, Herbert and Elke J. Jahn (2008) \Migration and the Wage Curve: A New Ap-
proach to Measure the Wage and Employment E￿ects of Migration", IZA Discussion Paper.
No. 3423, Bonn
[15] Card, David (1990). \The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market" in
Industrial and Labor Relation Review, XLIII, 245-257.
[16] Card, David and Thomas Lemieux (2001).\Can Falling Supply Explain the Rising Returns
to College for Younger Men? A Cohort Based Analysis" in Quarterly Journal of Economics,
CXVI, 705-746.
[17] D’Amuri, Francesco, Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. and Giovanni Peri (2008), \The Labor
Market Impact of Immigration in Western Germany in the 1990’s" NBER Working Paper
No. 13851, Cambridge, MA.
[18] Ethier, Wilfried J. (1985). \International Trade and Labor Migration" in The American
Economic Review 75 (September 1985), 691-707.
[19] Felbermayr, Gabriel and Wilhelm Kohler (2007). \Immigration and Native Welfare" in
International Economic Review 48 (3), 731-760.
[20] Hamermesh, Daniel S. (1993). Labor Demand, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[21] IOM (2005). World Migration 2005, International Organization for Migration, Geneva.
[22] Layard, R., S. Nickell and R. Jackman (2005). Unemployment: Macroeconomic Perfor-
mance and the Labour Market, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[23] Manacorda, Marco, Alan Manning & Jonathan Wadsworth (2006). \The Impact of Im-
migration on the Structure of Male Wages: Theory and Evidence from Britain", IZA
Discussion Paper No. 2352, Bonn.
32[24] OECD (2007). \International Migration Outlook: Annual Report 2007 Edition" Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
[25] O￿ce for National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division and Northern Ireland
Statistics and Research Agency. Central Survey Unit, Quarterly Labour Force Survey,
October - December, 2003. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive, August 2006. SN: 5423.
[26] O￿ce for National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division and Northern Ireland
Statistics and Research Agency. Central Survey Unit, Quarterly Labour Force Survey,
October - December, 2006. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive, April 2007. SN: 5609.
[27] Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P. and Peri Giovanni (2006). Rethinking the E￿ects of Immigration
on Wages, NBER Working Paper No. 12497, Cambridge, MA.
[28] Sinn, Hans-Werner, Gebhard Flaig, Martin Werding, Sonja Munz, Nicola D￿ ull and Herbert
Hofmann (2001): EU-Erweiterung und Arbeitskr￿ aftemigration Wege zu einer schrittweisen
Ann￿ aherung der Arbeitsm￿ arkte. Studie im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums f￿ ur Arbeit und
Sozialordnung. Ifo Institut, M￿ unchen.
[29] UN-DESA (2004). World Economic and Social Survey 2004: International Migration ,
United Nations, New York.
[30] Zaiceva, Anzelika (2006). \Reconciling the Estimates of Potential Migration into the En-
larged European Union", IZA Discussion Paper. No. 2519, Bonn
33Table 1: Summary Statistics (fully employed workers, Western Germany)
Sample statistics Population statistics
(SOEP) (Micro-census)
Immi-/ Experience Education Avg. Min. Avg. cell Growth rate
grant (M) (years) (class) number number of size (in 1984-2004
Native (N) of obs. obs./year thousand) (percent)
M 0-9 1&2 175 76 479.7 41.02
M 0-9 3 185 102 501.1 97.5
M 0-9 4&5 41 25 129.7 405.5
M 0-9 6 41 14 162.8 134.5
M 10-19 1&2 163 76 276.4 -46.1
M 10-19 3 138 91 299.6 23.4
M 10-19 4&5 41 19 85.0 63.4
M 10-19 6 47 8 110.5 590.1
M 20-29 1&2 156 57 274.9 -22.3
M 20-29 3 110 75 300.0 12.5
M 20-29 4&5 28 8 85.0 140.6
M 20-29 6 30 8 110.5 585.1
M >29 1&2 136 67 251.8 -1.5
M >29 3 70 27 231.0 22.8
M >29 4&5 13 6 59.5 229.3
M >29 6 34 5 245.5 569.3
SUM M 3,756.6
N 0-9 1&2 180 125 1,999.2 -40.5
N 0-9 3 613 468 3,833.1 -38.4
N 0-9 4&5 205 106 1,259.5 2.71
N 0-9 6 219 103 1,391.5 67.4
N 10-19 1&2 163 105 891.1 -43.0
N 10-19 3 645 322 3,393.6 18.5
N 10-19 4&5 191 67 1,096.7 90.1
N 10-19 6 205 84 1,252.3 79.5
N 20-29 1&2 144 99 844.4 -24.2
N 20-29 3 477 286 2,608.1 16.2
N 20-29 4&5 108 59 662.8 18.9
N 20-29 6 150 20 842.4 139.3
N >29 1&2 142 64 1,033.8 -53.0
N >29 3 353 153 2,360.7 2.0
N >29 4&5 77 45 584.8 6.0




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 3: Elasticities of q-complementarity
between migrants and natives
Educational Experience Direct Across Across \Received"
attainment level elasticity experience educational comple-
levels attainment mentarity
ISCED 1 - 2 0 - 10 years 0.0007 -0.0182 -0.0055 -0.0943
11 - 20 years 0.0111 -0.0127 -0.0038 -0.0895
21 - 30 years 0.0040 -0.0146 -0.0044 -0.0977
￿31 years 0.0070 -0.0132 -0.0040 -0.0985
ISCED 3 0 - 10 years -0.0030 -0.0160 -0.0097 -0.0826
11 - 20 years -0.0062 -0.0132 -0.0080 -0.0886
21 - 30 years -0.0050 -0.0120 -0.0073 -0.0903
￿ 31 years -0.0026 -0.0080 -0.0049 -0.0924
ISCED 4 - 5 0 - 10 years 0.0042 -0.0116 -0.0054 -0.0765
11 - 20 years -0.0009 -0.0076 -0.0029 -0.0849
21 - 30 years 0.0027 -0.0090 -0.0034 -0.0829
￿ 31 years 0.0036 -0.0060 -0.0023 -0.0866
ISCED 6 0 - 10 years 0.0113 -0.0110 -0.0059 -0.0772
11 - 20 years 0.0098 -0.0187 -0.0101 -0.0768
21 - 30 years 0.0125 -0.0133 -0.0072 -0.0792
￿ 31 years 0.0282 -0.0155 -0.0084 -0.0653
Elasticities of substitution used in calculations: Across educational groups, ￿e = 4:6. Across
experience levels, ￿x = 100. Native versus foreign labor, ￿M
e : for ISCED 1+2, ￿M
e = 9:0; for ISCED
3, ￿M
e = 10:6; for ISCED 4+5, ￿M
e = 8:9; for ISCED 6, ￿M
e = 4:3.
36Table 4: Parameter estimates { wage curve
Pooled OLS
Short-run Long-run
Employment ratio 0.084 0.550
(0.043) (0.144)
Unemployment rate -0.108 -0.703
(0.052) (0.180)




Employment ratio 0.004 0.137
(0.044) (0.053)
Unemployment rate -0.014 -0.186
(0.050) (0.067)








Log-linear speci￿cation (except unemployment rate). Dependent variable: wage rate.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clustering in education-experience-
nation groups. All regressions include education-speci￿c time trends. Number of
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